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Irwin, John  
RM/R 591  
FILE

Amended NND 901038

by RL-m/UTP 1/22/61

August 4, 1959

RUR - Mr. Long

Defense Memo to Secretary on Geneva

Attached for your information is a copy of a memorandum dated July 22 to the Secretary from Mr. Irwin entitled "Defense Proposal in Regard to Berlin."

Also attached are copies of the two enclosures to Mr. Irwin's letter. *memo*

H. I. Skofield  
S/S-RO  
Ext. 4445

[G. M. Porter]

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H TSkofield/blc

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE  
MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS  
PALAIS DES NATIONS - GENEVA, 1959

22 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY HERTER

SUBJECT: Defense Proposal in Regard to Berlin

Enclosed is a copy of a message received yesterday in which Secretary McElroy concurs in a Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal in regard to Berlin and asks that it be brought to your attention.

The Defense proposal is aimed at providing a Western initiative which would be useful in reducing tensions and in securing Western access rights to Berlin. It is an offer to relinquish the present three Western air corridors in exchange for FRG sovereignty over a new corridor 100 miles in width. A final fallback position would be a 60-mile wide corridor, with control only of Western traffic vested in the FRG or the Western Allies. The proposal is considered to be negotiable in regard to the exact width of the new corridor and degree of Western control to be exercised within the corridor.

For your information, access routes now consist of a north, central and south air corridor, each of which is 20 miles in width, plus designated surface routes located roughly in the central corridor from Helmstedt to Berlin. Western access via these routes is, as you know, now under the control of the Soviets, with East Germans exercising control in regard to German traffic.

It is noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff refer only to autobahn, railroad and aerial routes for access purposes since it is these which carry U.S. garrison supplies. However, the canal is of great importance to the West German and Berlin economy, the barge traffic amounting to over two million metric tons annually. In order to insure a viable Berlin economy I believe that any Western position should include the canal as well as autobahn, railroad and aerial routes. This could be done within the limitations of either a sixty or one hundred mile wide corridor since the Berlin-Helmstedt canal, autobahn and railroad are near each other.

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From the Soviet viewpoint, the proposal could provide advantages such as the following:

- (1) A reduction in the possibility of tension-creating access route incidents.
- (2) A reduction in the extent of "GDR" territory observable from authorized Western aircraft flights.
- (3) An opportunity to negotiate on a new position about which neither side has publicly adopted inflexible positions.

I am also including a memorandum from Admiral Dudley which sets forth some of the considerations that led to the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclusion.

*John N. Irwin II*  
JOHN N. IRWIN II

2 Enclosures:

1. Personal message for Mr. Irwin  
from Secretary McElroy dtd 21 July 59
2. Memo for Mr. Irwin from Adm. Dudley  
dtd 22 July 59 re Berlin Access Proposal

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C O P Y

21 July 1959

PERSONAL FOR IRWIN FROM SECRETARY McELROY

On 16 July JCS recommended that I make following proposal on Berlin access to Secretary Herter for presentation to Soviets during current Conference:

A. West should note existence of tension-producing factors in present access arrangements and should offer to reduce them by proposing to relinquish two of the three air corridors in exchange for an agreement guaranteeing Western control of a suitable single surface and air access corridor.

B. Maximum psychological impact should be obtained by an initial demand for transferring to FRG sovereignty a 100-mile-wide corridor between Helmstedt and Berlin. Negotiating range would be between this demand and final fallback position of a 60-mile-wide corridor, with control of Western traffic vested in the Western Allies. Western Powers should agree on extent to which their offer is negotiable within the above limits with regard to the width of the required corridor and degree of control they would exercise within the corridor.

C. The minimum Western access requirements should be control of a corridor 60 miles in width, containing both an autobahn and a railroad and of air space above the corridor at all altitudes which permit the economical and safe flight of all types of aircraft.

D. JCS consider that initial maximum proposal could be expected to produce either outright rejection or quid pro quo demands by the Soviets. Thus, any Soviet response except outright rejection could form the basis for continued negotiations. I believe that this proposal has considerable merit since it permits the West to take the initiative, and, if properly exploited, places US in a favorable light in the forum of public opinion, regardless of the Soviet reaction. Accordingly, I would like you to present this proposed tactic to Secretary Herter for possible use as a current Western negotiating position. If desired, JCS will be requested to provide detailed geographical boundaries of proposed corridor.

Enclosure /

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE  
MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS  
PALAIS DES NATIONS - GENEVA, 1959

22 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. IRWIN

SUBJECT: Berlin Access Proposal


Reference is made to the Berlin access proposal forwarded by Secretary McElroy in 880/JCS 423-59. While I don't recognize the off-spring in some respects, I sired this idea in January and February 1959.

In March, the JSEC, of which I am the Navy member, introduced a paper on this general subject. During the staffing of the paper, changes were made which rendered it non-negotiable from my viewpoint. During the recess of the Foreign Ministers' Conference, 19 June - 13 July 1959, the JSEC reintroduced a similar paper for the consideration of the JCS.

The final result approved by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense appears to be similar to the paper introduced except that in the original, consideration was also given to de facto recognition of the GDR. Notwithstanding the JCS decision, my personal view is and has been that one of the strongest bargaining points the West has is the acceptance of de facto recognition of the GDR providing we could get an adequate concession in return on the part of the Soviets. This is a fleeting asset which, unless exploited, will in time disappear. We have too often in the past failed to capitalize on such opportunities.

In light of the above it might be helpful for the Secretary to be apprised of some of the considerations that entered into the drafting of the proposal and the conclusions reached in the paper. The following sets forth some of these considerations.

Since there seems no possibility of German reunification and free elections at this time, West Berlin will remain a militarily indefensible island and a source of tension for the foreseeable future. Hostile



Soviet and "GDR" forces surround it and probably will continue to do so. From a military viewpoint and possibly a political one, we should attempt to settle the Berlin problem now because time is against us and a peaceful final solution is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

There are many cross currents in the German situation and probably at this time no country, including the Federal Republic of Germany, is as anxious to reunify Germany as is the United States. In spite of this, the responsibility and blame for any weakening of the Western position on Germany and Berlin will be attributed to the United States.

Mindful of the above, we should seek a negotiating position that would not weaken our world position, would offer some inducement to the Soviets and the GDR, would reduce the likelihood of armed conflict and as a minimum, reduce tensions. One and possibly the only practical way to reduce tensions connected with the Berlin situation is for the West or the FRG to control an adequate access route from West Germany to Berlin along the lines suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.

Enclosure:

Paper re Berlin Access Routes

PAUL L. DUBOY  
Rear Admiral, USN

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Authority <u>WD 883120</u>
<u>WLB</u> NARA, Date <u>6/20/86</u>

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BERLIN ACCESS ROUTES

A. COMPARISON OF DEFENSE PROPOSAL WITH CURRENT SITUATION

<u>Defense Proposal</u>	<u>Current Situation</u>
1. One aerial and surface corridor.	1. Three aerial corridors; one surface route which includes an autobahn, a railroad and a canal.
2. Aerial and surface corridor at least 60 miles wide.	2. Aerial corridors each 20 miles (32 KM) in width (utilizing BASC for flight clearances); surface route restricted to dimensions of autobahn, canal and railroad.
3. Unrestricted altitudes for aircraft.	3. Soviet insistence that maximum altitude of 10,000 feet not be exceeded. No BASC clearance above this altitude.
4. Western control of all Western traffic in corridor (air, rail, autobahn).	4. Soviet and "GDR" control at checkpoints of all traffic in corridors; traffic police controls (not accepted by the West) on the autobahn.

B. LATITUDE FOR NEGOTIATIONS

1. Width of single Western corridor: Propose 100 miles; minimum 60 miles.
2. Altitude for aircraft: Propose unrestricted for Western aircraft; accept altitude bands, such as 3 - 5 thousand feet and 10 - 15 thousand feet in which non-Western aircraft could operate without Western clearance.
3. Degree of control: Propose transfer of sovereignty over corridor to FRG; accept Western Three-Power control of all traffic within the corridor or, minimum, accept Western control of traffic on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn, railroad, and aerial traffic at all altitudes except provisions could be made for aerial traffic crossing corridor or at certain specified altitudes in corridor.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

*CSH*

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Enclosed herewith are three memoranda which I hope will be useful to you in your forthcoming negotiations in Geneva. These are:

Working Papers for Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting (Tab A)

Reduction of the Berlin Garrison (Tab B)

Evaluation of Position in 1959 and 1961/62 (Tab C)

Sincerely,

*Lucy L. Perry*

3 Enclosures

As stated above

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

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*W.B. NARA, Date 6/20/84*



Attachments  
not with this  
when it come back  
from Geneva.

Instead there was  
attached Lewis memo  
of July 22 (with its  
2 enclosures) entitled 'Defense  
Proposed in regard to Berlin'